By Kevin Anderson, author of Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism

After viewing some alternate perspectives -- evolutionary biology (Richard Dawkins), structuralism and poststructuralism (especially Bourdieu), pragmatism (Richard Rorty) -- that are very influential today, this essay offers another look at three important dialectical thinkers, Herbert Marcuse, Karel Kosík, and Raya Dunayevskaya. It concludes: "We need to examine some of the questions raised since Marx or Lukács, especially on difference, particularity, gender, and sexuality. Otherwise dialectics could atrophy into a 'classical' perspective, like those of Plato or Confucius, rather than a living and critical philosophy for today." It is based on a public lecture Wuhan University in China on October 29, 2007.

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The crucial point is not only that for every stage of phenomenological development there is a corresponding historic stage, but also that thought molds its experience in such a manner that it will never again be possible to keep these two opposites in separate realms.... No matter what the phenomena are, thought molds the form of experience in a way that determines both the experience and the "ways in which consciousness must know the object as itself."
--Raya Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, 1973(1)

Hegelian categories are all recovered in Marxism, and it is no accident that they were reactualized in Europe around, say, the years 1917-23.... And if after 1923 this renaissance of dialectical thought subsequently ended, it was because the revolutionary period was clearly over.
--Lucien Goldmann, "The Dialectic Today" (1970)(2)

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I. The Modern and Postmodern Anti-Dialectic

We do not live in one of those periods, of the type Lucien Goldmann mentioned, of recovery of the Hegelian dialectic in Marxism and radical thought. Instead, we are in an epoch when the dominant intellectual currents all, in one way or another, reject the dialectic of Hegel and of Marx. This is true of even of critical and leftist thought nowadays, as will be discussed in this lecture.

The Crude Materialism of Sociobiology and Evolutionary Biology

In his acclaimed book of a decade ago, Consilience, Edward O. Wilson, the founder of sociobiology (now more often called evolutionary biology), wants to speak of the unity of all human knowledge, albeit in a positivist sense. The example of dialectical thinking he singles out for attack is Kant's famous statement to the effect that "there is in man a power of self-determination, independent of any coercion through sensuous impulses." In an attack that could as easily have been made against Hegel as well, Wilson writes condescendingly that "this formulation has a comforting feel to it, but it makes no sense at all in terms of material or imaginable entities." Wilson concludes his brief treatment of German idealism by suggesting that if these thinkers had "known modern biology or experimental psychology they would not have reasoned as they did."(3)

Other evolutionary biologists are less conservative, for example Richard Dawkins, author of the acclaimed defense of atheism, The God Delusion (2006). Dawkins writes in terms of “selfish genes,” not individuals. Therefore individuals might act in a selfless manner if that protects their gene pool; this is because we are programmed by biology to sacrifice for the group, in order to protect not ourselves as individuals, but our gene pool (children, siblings, etc.) Not only is Dawkins less Hobbesian than Wilson; he also directs his aim against the conservative religious fundamentalists, whether Christian, Islamic, or based on other religious traditions.

Nonetheless, some reactionary ideas continue to try to base themselves upon evolutionary biology. Take for example the case of Lawrence Summers, who had to resign from his position as President of Harvard University after suggesting in a public forum that women’s lower scores in mathematics might be based in biological difference. Summers called for more research in this area, referring to recent studies in evolutionary biology. The outcry was so great, with women scientists and other scholars speaking out forcefully against such biologistic determinism, that Summers was forced to resign his position 18 months later.

Sociobiology/evolutionary biology denies historical materialism’s notion that human consciousness grows and develops through history, which is a product of the self-creation of human beings. Although evolutionary biology/sociobiology is a materialism, and thus fights against religious obscurantism, it is a non-dialectical, non-historical materialism. It falls into what Marx, in describing Wilson and Dawkins’s mentor, Charles Darwin, had already called the "abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism which excludes history and its process."(4) This passage from Capital is not as well known among Marx scholars as it should be, in large part because Engels spoke of Darwin and Marx as equivalent thinkers in his famous oration at Marx’s funeral.

The Heritage of Structuralism and Poststructuralism

A second line of thought dominant today can be discerned, this time mainly among oppositional and leftist thinkers. I refer to those theorists and philosophers who have been influenced by structuralism and poststructuralism.

The famous French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu represents a version of the French structuralist tradition, even though he denied that label. Bourdieu organized an intellectual network supporting the workers during the great 1995-96 strikes against a conservative government. In a 1998 manifesto, "For a Leftist Left," he and other French intellectuals counterposed the movement of the immigrants and the unemployed in the streets to those who accepted the logic of the world market. However, Bourdieu also kept his distance from Marxism, and was extremely hostile to all forms of idealism and humanism as well. For example, listen to how he attacked the existentialist dialectician Jean-Paul Sartre. The existentialist philosopher had once written, in what I consider to be a fine dialectical passage:

"For it is necessary to reverse the common opinion and acknowledge that it is not the harshness of a situation or the sufferings it imposes that lead people to conceive of another state of affairs in which things would be better for everybody. It is on the day that we are able to conceive of another state of affairs, that a new light is cast on our trouble and our suffering and we decide they are unbearable."(5)

Here, Sartre is arguing for the crucial importance of the idea of freedom as the pre-condition for a genuinely revolutionary transformation. In his critique, Bourdieu points correctly to the problematic nature of Sartre's concept of "choice," but then dismisses Sartre's entire statement as a form of idealism that is "devoid of objectivity."(6)

Bourdieu defines his central category, the "habitus," as "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations." The habitus "produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions...while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation" (p. 78). Bourdieu explicitly puts forward the habitus as an alternative to the notion of "the future conceived as an 'absolute possibility' [absolute Möglichkeit] in Hegel's sense" (p. 76).

The habitus is supposed to be less one-sided than Claude Lévi-Strauss or Louis Althusser's "structures," but really isn't as different from structuralism as Bourdieu's adherents claim it to be.(7) For example, even where Bourdieu discusses dialectics, he is so dismissive of freedom, consciousness, and the human subject that the only time he can bring himself to refer to freedom is as "conditioned and conditional freedom" (p. 95). Thus, his stress is on the structures of domination, not on their inner contradictions or on how to overcome them.

During the 1980s, philosophies of radical difference rooted in Nietzsche and Derrida attacked Marxism and dialectics as totalizing modes of thought that were oppressive and false. A good example of the philosophy of difference is found in a 1987 statement from Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Gilles Deleuze:

"The goal is… what we call a culture of dissensus that strives for a deepening of individual positions and a resingularization of individuals and human groups. What folly to claim that everyone – immigrants, feminists, rockers, regionalists, pacifists, ecologists, and hackers – should agree on a same vision of things! We should not be aiming for a programmatic agreement that erases their differences."(8)

Cohn-Bendit and Deleuze conspicuously leave aside the labor movement from their list of movements, and capitalism from their conception of what to oppose.

In recent years, Antonio Negri and his frequent collaborator Michael Hardt have undermined the philosophy of difference. They have helped to refocus critical theory on capitalism as the underlying mechanism of domination and the main force of oppression. In so doing, they have become leading theorists of the anti-capitalist and global justice movements. Negri and Hardt have synthesized Marx and Deleuze/Foucault into a new radical theory of domination and resistance, but they do so from an openly Nietzschean and anti-dialectical perspective.

In their celebrated Empire (2000), they attack Hegel as a theorist of capitalism and colonialism. They target as well all forms of dialectic, including Marxian dialectics, as part of “logic of modern domination.” This is because of “its relegating of the multiplicity of difference to binary oppositions and its subsequent subsumption of these differences in a unitary order.”(9) They are referring of course to the type of procedure in Hegel’s Logic where identity breaks down into difference but then difference is subsumed by contradiction. Negri and Hardt attack Hegel’s theory of contradiction, also a core part of Marxian dialectics, for ultimately subsuming difference into totality and teleology. Because of this, they conclude that the “postmodernist project must be nondialectical” (p. 140).

Pragmatism and 'Everyday Life' versus Dialectics

Members of a third strand of contemporary theory are dissatisfied with the over-emphasis on structure in Bourdieu and other structuralists. They say we need to look more at "agency.” In 1998, two American sociologists summed up some of these critiques of Bourdieu when they criticized him for giving "selective attention to the role of habitus and routinized practice" and for viewing "human agency as habitual, repetitive, and taken for granted." While they say they want to focus on "the constitutive creativity of human action," the alternative they espouse is not the dialectic of Hegel or Marx, which they do not even mention. Instead, they identify with American pragmatism, which, they claim, grasps human creativity by focusing on everyday life as a process of self-constitution. (10)

Of course, we need to remember that, alongside their belief in incremental change and pragmatic discourse rather than revolutionary ruptures, the founders of pragmatism first embraced and then broke decisively with Hegel. William James, for example, in his famous book A Pluralistic Universe, singled out Hegel's Absolutes for particular attack. He termed Hegel’s philosophy a form of "vicious intellectualism" because of Hegel's search for truth as opposed to the multiple truths of a relativistic worldview. For his part, John Dewey wrote of "absolutism versus experimentalism."(11) In the continuing hostility today to all absolutes, including even Hegel's magnificent Absolute Idea, we can still feel the effects of these century-old arguments.

The late Richard Rorty, also a pragmatist philosopher, attacked the dialectic throughout his career. Rorty summed up much of the contemporary criticism of the dialectic -- and of totality, and of essences -- in his 1992 article, "Intellectuals and the End of Socialism":

"I hope we have reached a time when we can finally get rid of the conviction common to Plato and Marx, the conviction that there must be large theoretical ways of finding out how to end injustice, as opposed to small experimental ways. I hope we can learn to get along without the conviction that there is something deep--such as the human soul, or human nature, or the will of God, or the shape of history--which provides a subject matter for grand, politically useful theory." (12)

Rorty of course saw postmodernists as sharing his critique of totality, essences, and dialectic. But he also cited Habermas, who had moved from dialectical thinking to pragmatism, especially in his critiques of the “philosophy of consciousness.”(13) For his part, Rorty wanted to uproot out not only Marxist dialectics, but also the whole tradition of critical, dialectical thinking, going back to Plato. He concludes that no "alternative to capitalism" exists and that therefore: "the only hope for getting the money necessary to eliminate intolerable inequities is to facilitate the activities of people like Henry Ford …and even Donald Trump"!(14)

However, it should also be noted that pragmatism, this particularly American form of philosophy, was never uncontested in the U.S., any more than structuralism and poststructuralism have been uncontested in France. As Raya Dunayevskaya wrote, in the period "of the 1930s..., far from pragmatism and American thought being one and the same, Marxian dialectics was very much on the scene." (15)

II. Dialectical Perspectives

Marcuse’s Dialectics of Negativity: A Critique of Pragmatism and Positivism

Dunayevskaya was referring most of all to Herbert Marcuse’s Reason and Revolutino, first published in 1941, at the height of John Dewey’s influence in American philosophy. Reason and Revolution holds the important distinction of being the first Hegelian Marxist book to appear in English. In addition, it was the first systematic analysis of Hegel's major works from a Marxist standpoint in any language. Reason and Revolution views Marx's work as grounded in Hegel's concept of dialectic. Theoretically, Marx's work is presented as a critique not only of capitalism, but also, at least implicitly, as the foundation for a critique of Stalinist Communism.

Not only does Marcuse's book contain a critical analysis of Hegel's major works such as the Phenomenology of Mind and the Science of Logic, but it also includes the first serious treatment in English of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. This Hegelian-Marxian heritage is counterposed to what Marcuse considered to be the essentially conservative world-view of positivism, which teaches people "to view and study the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid laws.” (16)

But Marcuse attacks not only positivism, but also pragmatism, at least implicitly. In his discussion of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, Marcuse attacks the world of common sense and even that of everyday experience, if it is not mediated by dialectical reason. For Hegel, writes Marcuse, the "world in reality is not as it appears, but as it is comprehended by philosophy"(1941, p. 93). Further, Hegel gives us ground to attack the naive perspectives of everyday life and commonsense experience: "Knowledge begins when philosophy destroys the experience of daily life." The latter is only "the starting point of the search for truth"(1941, p. 103), which is ultimately based on a critique of common sense notions of reality. Thus, Marcuse identifies strongly with the specifically Hegelian critique of commonsense experience.

Marcuse wrote a lengthy article on Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts immediately after they appeared for the first time in German in 1932. There, in the conclusion, he quotes the following passage from the young Marx's Hegel critique:

"'The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of its final result, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creative principle - is thus that Hegel conceives the self-creation of the human being [des Menschen] as a process.'" (17)

In his essay on the young Marx, Marcuse already points to the above as illustrating "the positive meaning of negation."(18) In Reason and Revolution, Marcuse spells out more explicitly the centrality to Marx of Hegel's concept of negativity, arguing that here, in this text, lie "the origins of the Marxian dialectic" (p. 282). He writes further: "For Marx, as for Hegel, the dialectic takes note of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is 'the moving and creative principle.' The dialectic is the dialectic of negativity." Negativity is important to Marx in part because: "Economic realities exhibit their own inherent negativity” (p. 282).

Marcuse's stress on Hegel's concept of negativity is new and original. It is at of course at variance with the interpretations of more conservative Hegel scholars, who tend instead to stress categories such as reconciliation and mediation. But it also differs from the emphasis on the category of totality in Lukács's History and Class Consciousness. written of course before Marx's 1844 discussion on Hegel's concept of negativity as "the moving and creative principle" had been published in any language.

Even after the 1844 Manuscripts were published, however, Russian Stalinists were generally hostile to any emphasis on the concept of negativity, viewing it as a trace of idealistic Hegelianism. In the 1950s for example, the Soviet ideologist V. A. Karpushin tried to banish the issue of negativity from Marxism, arguing in a discussion of the Manuscripts that Marx opposed the notion of "some kind of negativity which allegedly inherently clings to things, as Hegel put it." (19)

In his discussion of the Science of Logic in Reason and Revolution, Marcuse addresses some of the consequences of the dialectic of negativity. He discusses what he terms Hegel's concept of "real possibility"(p. 151). He writes that in Hegel's concept of essence, the "possible and the actual are in a dialectical relation" (p. 150). This leads Marcuse, as a Marxist, to write that for Hegel "a new [social] system is really possible if the conditions for it are present in the old"(p. 152).

Kosík's Dialectical Critique of the 'Pseudoconcrete'

The crude materialism sociobiology/evolutionary biology, the anti-dialectics of structuralism/poststructuralism, and the concentration on common sense in pragmatism each exemplify, albeit in different ways, what the Czech Marxist Humanist Karel Kosík called the false world of the pseudoconcrete. All three of these currently dominant perspectives not only avoid the specific historical circumstances of human thought and action, but also and more importantly, deny that "thought molds experience" in a liberatory manner, as Raya Dunayevskaya once wrote. (20)

This year, it is almost 40 years after Prague Spring of 1968, when the people of what was then Czechoslovakia tried to develop a “socialism with a human face,” only to be repressed by the Russian military. The leading philosopher of that Marxist humanism of 1968 in Czechoslovakia was Karel Kosík. Among Kosík’s greatest contributions was his concept of the pseudoconcrete. In the famous discussion with which he begins his book Dialectics of the Concrete, Kosík calls the pseudoconcrete "the collection of phenomena that crowd the everyday environment and the routine atmosphere of human life." This is the world "of man's fetishized praxis (which is not identical with the revolutionary-critical praxis of mankind)."(21) Of course, Kosík is no Platonist, and recognizes, as does Hegel in his discussion of "illusory being" [Schein] in the Science of Logic, that there are links between the fetishized world of the pseudoconcrete and the dialectically concrete.

However, Kosík warns us: "Dialectics is... the opposite of doctrinaire systematization or romanticization of routine ideas" and that dialectics "therefore has to abolish the apparent autonomy of the world of immediate everyday contacts" (p. 6).

Dunayevskaya’s Hegelian Marxist Humanism

Kosík and Marcuse develop dialectics as a critique of the pseudo-concrete worlds of positivism, pragmatism, and Stalinism. Yet their work does not explicitly answer anti-dialectical thinkers from the poststructuralist and pragmatist camps of today on two of their major points: 1. the accusation that dialectics involves an over-arching totality shorn of difference; 2. the notion that dialectics as a totalizing perspective is incapable of conceptualizing particularity and difference, which ever since Plato tends to swallow up into totality. Specifically, dialectics is charged with not having room for the perspectives of minorities, of women, of marginalized groups, since it can only grasp grand totalities like capitalism or progress.

Dunayevskaya, in building on both Lenin and Marx, took over from Lenin the notion that a new stage of capitalism, imperialism, unleashed a new stage of opposition, the national liberation movements. These anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movements were not necessarily proletarian, but they were allies of the working classes of the imperialist countries. In dialectical terms, as developed in Lenin’s Hegel Notebooks of 1914-15 (which Dunayevskaya was the first to translate into English), national liberation was the new dialectical contradiction within imperialism. This meant that a new force of opposition was coming onto the scene, not part of the usual totality capital/labor, but somewhat outside it, moving from the periphery of capitalism, inside colonial and semi-colonial countries.

After Lenin’s death, as Central European capitalism developed into fascism during the 1930s, new dialectical contradictions emerged among the resistance movements to fascism and militarism. China’s revolution, for example, grew out of both national liberation and resistance to fascism/militarism. In the U.S., the contradictions of capitalism in the post-World War II era were analyzed by Dunayevskaya as including, not just the proletariat or working class as a single force of revolution and opposition, but instead four forces of revolution: workers, Blacks, women, and youth. In her book Women’s Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution (1985), she spelled out this dialectic for the feminist movement, but unseparated from Marxist dialectics and a critique of the capitalist mode of production.

Dunayevskaya also addressed the notion of totality within dialectics. In 1958 in Marxism and Freedom, Dunayevskaya had considered Hegel’s Absolute Idea in Hegel’s Logic as a totality, as the unity of theory and practice. She was stressing Hegel's statement at the beginning of the Absolute Idea chapter in the Science of Logic to the effect that "the Absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical idea. Each by itself is still one-sided...”(22) But by the 1970s with Philosophy and Revolution (1973), her stress is different. She focuses not so much on unity as on contradiction, diremption, and opposition right within the Absolute itself. She in fact begins her Hegel Society lecture of 1974 (reprinted in Power of Negativity) by noting that Hegel's Absolute Idea "is so totally infected with negativity"(23) that Hegel begins the Absolute Idea chapter by telling us that the Absolute "contains the highest opposition within itself."(24)

But even that point, opposition and negativity within the Absolute, is not the whole of what Dunayevskaya wants to convey in that 1974 lecture. Far from it, for she then writes: "The same first paragraph of the Absolute Idea that riveted our attention to the highest opposition, cautioned against imposing an old duality on the new unity of opposites reached, -- the Theoretical and Practical Idea. 'Each of these by itself is still one-sided.' The new, the highest opposition, rather has to self-develop."(25) Here Dunayevskaya's stricture (which she says is Hegel's own) "against imposing an old duality on the new unity of opposites reached" refers to the fact that the opposition within the Absolute Idea is not a return to the old type of opposition between the practical idea and the theoretical idea. That former opposition has by now been transcended or sublated [aufgehoben], and again and again, new types of opposition will emerge. Dunayevskaya then writes -- paraphrasing Marx in 1844 -- of "the power of the negative which is the creative element" and points over and over again to "fresh beginning[s]" which Hegel develops in that Absolute Idea chapter.(26)

In this sense, Dunayevskaya holds onto the Hegelian concept of totality, first singled out by Lukács in History and Class Consciousness, but it is not a closed totality. She reinterprets totality to encompass Absolute Idea as absolute negativity rather than as any kind of ultimate metaphysical rest in a closed totality. This allows the dialectic to connect to the richness and variety of movements for change over the past few decades -- workers, students, gay and lesbian movements, women’s movements, movements of ethnic and national minorities -- without giving up the notion of a universal drive toward liberation. By creating a unifying point through a dialectical vision of a new society, free of the domination of capital and its value form, and also of sexism, racism, and heterosexism, she avoids the pseudoconcrete that envelops so many of the postmodern philosophies of difference.

Concluding Remark

We cannot recover and develop the a dialectical critique of society and thought today without taking a plunge into the fullness of Hegel's dialectic, which Marx once called "the source of all dialectic."(27) The rejection of, or silence toward, Hegel and the dialectic in so much of contemporary thought makes it extremely difficult for philosophy to advance beyond the traps in which it finds itself today. We need to open ourselves anew to the dialectic, to be unafraid to allow it to mold our experience in a critical, revolutionary manner. But this has to be a reinterpreted dialectic, not one that emphasizes totality to the exclusion of the problems of identity and difference.

Dialectical thinking has not only to engage and critique the recent forms of anti-dialectical philosophy. It also has to critically appropriate into the dialectics of the 21st century some of the insights from postmodernism and pragmatism, although probably not evolutionary biology. We need to examine some of the questions raised since Marx or Lukács, especially on difference, particularity, gender, and sexuality. Otherwise dialectics could atrophy into a “classical” perspective, like those of Plato or Confucius, rather than a living and critical philosophy for today.

Notes

1. Raya Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and From Marx to Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, orig. 1973; Chinese edition: Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1999), p. 9.
2. Lucien Goldmann, “The Dialectic Today” (1970) in his Cultural Criticism, translated by Bart Grahl, with an Introduction by William Maryl (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1976), p. 112-13.
3. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 248-49.
4. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: Pelican, 1976), p. 494.
5. Cited in Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, orig. French edition 1972), p. 74. The existing English translation of Sartre's Being and Nothingness by Hazel Barnes (NY: Washington Square Press, 1966, p. 561 -- in all editions, it occurs on the third page of the chapter "Being and Doing: Freedom") totally garbles this passage, and it had to be translated anew for Bourdieu's book.
6. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, p. 74. Further page references are directly in the text.
7. For a critical discussion of Bourdieu from inside the French Left that places him as a structuralist, see François Dosse, History of Structuralism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
8. Cited in John Sanbonmatsu, The Postmodern Prince (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), p. 14.
9. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 140.
10. Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische, "What Is Agency?" American Journal of Sociology 103:4 (January 1998), pp. 963, 969.
11. For a summary of this history, see Richard J. Bernstein, "Why Hegel Now?” Review of Metaphysics 31:1 (September 1977), pp. 29-60.
12. Richard Rorty, "The Intellectuals and the End of Socialism," The Yale Review, Vol. 80:1/2 (April 1992), p. 4.
13. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Two volumes. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984-91.
14. Richard Rorty, "The Intellectuals and the End of Socialism," p. 4.
15. Raya Dunayevskaya, The Myriad Global Crises of the 1980s and the Nuclear World Since World War II (Chicago: News & Letters, 1986), p. 5.
16. "Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, originally published in 1941), p. 326. Further page references are directly in the text.
17. Marx, Karl, "Kritik der Hegelschen Dialektik und Philosophie überhaupt,” in Marx and Engels, Werke: Ergänzungsband I (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), p. 574, emphasis added.
18. Marcuse, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism,” in Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 46.
19. Cited in Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, original edition 1958; Chinese edition, with a preface by Wang Ruoshui: Shenyang: Liaoning Press, 1999), p. 62.
20. Dunayevskaya, Philosophy and Revolution, p. 9.
21. Karel Kosík, Dialectics of the Concrete, trans. by Karel Kovanda with James Schmidt (Boston: D. Reidel, 1976, orig. Czech edition 1961), p. 2. Further pagination directly in the text.
22. Hegel, Science of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 824; see also Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, p. 42.
23. Dunayevskaya, The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx, edited by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 163.
24. Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 824.
25. Dunayevskaya, Power of Negativity, p. 165.
26. Dunayevskaya, Power of Negativity, p. 167.
27. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p.744.